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The Problem of Expertise




The paper was given by Stefan Beck during a meeting at the Villa Vigoni, Italy in autumn
2012. Stefan Beck passed away before had the time to revise the paper for publication. We
are deeply grateful to Gisela Welz for giving her permission to publish the manuscript in
the present volume. Special thanks to Gisela Welz for checking the manuscript and
making some ajustements, and to Martina Klausner, who completed the bibliography.
 
From Knowledge to Knowing
Muted Pragmatist Genealogies
1 The paper takes its starting point from recent debates about expertise and expert systems
in the social sciences in the late 20th and early 21st century. In these debates, expertise,
expert knowledge or expert systems are understood to be key elements of late-modern
“knowledge societies” (Felt et al. 2007). Expertise figures prominently, among other fields,
in  political  science or  transformation  studies understood  here  as  a  central  means  of
governing  modern  societies,  potentially  in  conflict  with  democratic  processes  of
deliberation; or it is held in science and technology studies to be a repository of innovation
and development. But, needless to say, expertise is focused upon also in academic studies
of learning and education or in psychology and the neuro- or cognitive sciences, as well
as in applied fields where expert knowledge, skills and competencies of actors have to
undergo rapid transformation (e.g. in biomedicine, in nursing or organizational studies
etc.); and of course, expertise is the target of systematic assessment and evaluation in
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management and economic studies. The problem of expertise, of its creation, evaluation,
distribution etc., then, has a nearly ubiquitous presence in current scholarly, political,
and  public  debates.  However,  in  puzzling  contrast  to  the  undisputed  centrality  of
expertise, dominant ways of conceptualising expertise in the social sciences are focusing
more on knowledge as an idealistic “content” (Bestandsmodus) than on knowledge practices in
a broader sense, that is, on the ways experience is made, transformed from emplaced/
contextualized  knowing  (integrated  into  practices)  to  generalizable  knowledge
(abstracted from concrete practices), from its social organisation or contestation to its
distribution and (after learning) its application in “skilful practices” open to reflection
and revision (Praxismodus).
2 The  central  argument  pursued  in  what  follows  is  simple:  in  order  to  address  these
desiderata,  an  amended  theoretical  as  well  as  methodological  approach  is  needed.
Inspiration for a revision might be drawn from a rather “disorderly,” rarely connected set
of theoretical programs: from pragmatist theories of experience, from the anthropology
of knowledge and “situated cognition,” from phenomenological analyses or Lebenswelt-
sociology  à  la Schütz  as  well  as  from science  studies  and the  sociology  of  scientific
knowledge. These theoretical approaches might be seen as unfamiliar bedfellows, but – as
will  be argued in the following – they all share an interest in what might be termed
“ecologies of expertise,” in the processuality of perception, cognition, and action, in the
social  and  cultural  impregnations  of  thinking  and  acting  in  context.  Clearly,  this
perspective has many intellectual  roots,  but American pragmatism in the versions of
William James, John Dewey or Arthur Bentley definitely constitutes a fascinating and still
inspiring  rhizomatic  knot, a  kind  of  theoretical  “zero  point”  where  many  inspiring
impulses originate.
3 Yet, the way in which pragmatist impulses exerted direct and indirect influences – e.g. –
on anthropological programs like Gregory Bateson’s “Ecology of Mind” (Bateson 1972),
Edwin Hutchins’ “distributed cognition” or “cognitive ecology” (Hutchins 1995; Hutchins
2010),  Lave/Wenger’s  “communities  of  practice”  (Lave  & Wenger  1991),  Tim Ingold’s
relational anthropology  that  culminates  in  the  suggestion  to  “re-animate”
intellectualistic western concepts of thought (Ingold 2006) or Clifford Geertz’ view that
anthropology  should  inquire  into  the  uses  of  culture-specific  artifice  that  makes
“experiences”  (Geertz  1986)  is  still  under-explored,  to  say  the  least.  What  these
anthropological  approaches  have  in  common  is  a  strictly  relational re-conception  of
perception,  cognition,  experience  and  knowing  that  stresses  a)  its  emplacement,  its
embodiment as well as its temporal dynamics and b) an equally relational view on how
knowledge is put into action reflexively. What is more, these approaches are supported
by  naturalistic  perspectives  on  action and  perception  as  they  are  suggested  by  the
neurosciences and modern biology. While in all of these anthropological approaches an
explicit reference to pragmatist theories is conspicuously absent, they share at least a
strong family resemblance with pragmatism if not a partially concealed ‘genetic’ kinship.1
4 I  will  go  back  to  these  subterranean  conjunctions  between  recent  anthropological
theories and pragmatist thought in the second half of this paper in a rather pointillistic
manner. In the first part, I will briefly sketch how expertise is conceptualized according
to established disciplinary perspectives in philosophy, sociology, political science etc. As
will be shown, these perspectives are only partially helpful to understand the dynamics of
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expertise, expert knowledge or expert systems from an anthropological point of view.
These dominant approaches looking at expertise may:
1. Cover  how  a  phenomenon  in  the  world  can  be  adequately  represented  –  this  is  an
ontological  question  about  “knowability”  –  and  to  what  extent  those  representing  the
phenomenon  possess  a  certain  competence  about  it  –  here  an  epistemological  question
lingers in the background: it is about the very possibility of “knowing” something; or
2. ask  what  an  expert/what  expertise  is compared  to  non-experts  or  non-expertise.  Here,
questions regarding the specific  form of knowledge or the social  form of its  application
stand in the focus; or
3. inquire into what “kinds of people”2 count as “legitimate contributors to decision-making”
especially  at  those  points  where  science,  technology  and  the  political  domain  intersect
(Collins 2002: 252ff.). Hence, these studies inquire into the organizational or social fields (in
the sense of Bourdieu) where expertise is contested and applied;
4. analyse how expert communities produce truth claims and how these are mobilized and put
to work in the political domain. Here, social or political scientists inquire how “expertise”
succeeds  or  fails  to  better  the  social  processes,  how  expertise  is  fed  into  political  or
institutional  processes  (Weingart),  how  (universal)  “truth”  meets  (always  partial)
“interests.”3
5 These  questions  are  important  but  –  as  will  be  argued  –  somewhat  miss  core
anthropological research interests, as Dominic Boyer argued already in 2008. However, as
Boyer – I think rightly – observed, theoretical perspectives on knowledge and expertise in
international anthropology remain at best underdeveloped. Boyer (2008: 39) defined the
expert “as an actor who has developed skills in, semiotic-epistemic competence for, and
attentional concern with, some sphere of practical activity.”
6 This very helpful definition – blurring established distinctions between skilled actors and
“certified experts” – opens up a much broader problematic that is anthropological, and
not only social or philosophical in its nature: it forces anthropologists to take cognitive,




7 Instead of following the well established paths of inquiry eyed by the social scientists, I
suggest to follow a practice-focused theoretical approach that is informed by pragmatism
as it was understood by William James, John Dewey or Arthur Bentley. And I suggest to
start from scratch,  and ask:  how do certain abilities,  skills,  capabilities and aptitudes
emerge in actors? How are they stabilized (using which technologies?) and how are they
put into a form of practice that necessarily involves improvisation and creativity (to cope
with known and unknown un-knowings)? How and through which social, cultural and
cognitive  processes  is  experience gradually  turned  into  expertise?  What  distinguishes
experienced  practices from  socially  recognized  expertise?  Is  this  distinction  only
“external,”  “ascribed”?  How  is  expertise  done,  so  that  its  specific  performances  get
acknowledged  by  others  as  constituting  expertness?  From  that  it  might  follow  a
symmetrical analysis of how non-(yet-)experts make use of expert performances.
8 Such a practice-focused theoretical turn on expertise and experts calls for a number of
theoretical as well as methodological adjustments: instead of knowledge, knowings become
central (Dewey & Bentley 1975), and the search for the favourable environments for re-
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producing knowings become the key question.  As  Tim Ingold argues,  all  knowledge  is
generated within a field of practices, and these practices are always characterized by bodily
movements – be it moving in space (in Ingold’s phrasing “we know as we go”) or by
gradually accumulating skills in time through practical involvement with changing social
as well as physical environments (Ingold 2000: 44 ff.; 229). Knowings, then, need to be
conceptualized as emplaced and embodied. As the Australian anthropologist David Turnbull
argues, the “root meanings of many terms closely associated with making, meaning, and
knowledge” are associated with bodily movement through space. Central to knowledge
and to the dynamics of its generation, then, is 
[…]  the  idea  of  active  work,  and  of  moving  through  space,  cognitively  and
physically. [However, these …] elements of activity, work and movement are now
almost  absent  and  invisible  [in  recent,  western  perspectives  on  knowledge],  as
evidenced in our constant use of terms like “method” or “way” without realising
they literally mean paths or trails. (Turnbull 2007: 142) 
9 Turnbull  coined the term “knowledge space” to characterize the actively constructed
“environments” where specific ways of knowing are generated (Turnbull 2000).
10 According to the dominant approach in vogue in the social sciences, and in contrast to
these  perspectives  informed by  practice  or  performance  theory,  expertise  –  and the
specific  knowings  involved  –  is  held  to  be  much  more  static and  de-contextualized;
expertise is conceptualized more like a fait accompli (still having some truth-index) than
as a fait social in the making (embracing constructivism). Context and dynamics come into
the focus only as secondary elements, as a problem of application, not as a problem of co-
constitution.  Instead  of  classifying  expertise  as  either  interactive  or  contributory  (as
Collins  &  Evans  2002  did,  seeing  expertise  as  rather  stable,  but  applied in  dynamic
contexts)  the  main  interest  of  anthropologists  will  be  in  ethnographic  analyses  of
situations where actors successfully participate in the expertness of others through the
co-construction of knowledge spaces or knowledge scapes. This – again – means thinking about
expertise relationally: the interest is focused upon how expertise is shared between actors
or made to bear on the situations others find themselves involved in.
11 Yet  while  this  practice-focused  theoretical  perspective  resonates  well  with
anthropological  views  on  “apprenticeship”  or  “situated  learning”  (Lave  1991),
“communities of practice” (Wenger 1998), “embodied knowledge” (Barth 2002) and so on,
it is unclear whether it is scalable: the perspective is biased in terms of a pertinacious
methodological and theoretical individualism or situationalism as well as a cognitivist
heritage that can only partially be alleviated by interactionist insights. Obviously, any
attempt  to  “scale”  a  practice  theoretical  approach  on  expertise  in  order  to
ethnographically  analyze its  workings  in  complex  systems  (organizations)  or  in
assemblages of an equipped humanity (clinics, actor-network societies) will require some
theoretical wriggling as well as methodological twists and turns.
12 As a starting point, the notion of “ecologies of expertise,” as it was recently introduced in
social studies, might be helpful, pointing to an integrated perspective on material, social
and cultural contexts where expertise is made and made useful. The notion introduces a
distinctly  relational  perspective  to  knowing  that  seems  to  have  the  potential  to  be
compatible with core pragmatist insights. Unfortunately, as it will become apparent later,
the application of the metaphor of “ecology” is problematic in two respects. Firstly, it
creates  crucial  theoretical  pitfalls,  especially  when  an  expired,  simplistic  notion  of
“ecology” is borrowed from biology. Secondly, the concept is used in a limited way in its
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dominant usage, where the focus is more or less exclusively on applications of expertise
in complex institutional settings, missing somewhat the question how acting in the world
builds  up  a  certain  kind  of  reflective  experience  (cf.  on  the  notion  of  “reflective
practitioner” Rolfe 1997) that is consecutively – through lessons taught in practice and
acquisition  of  transactional  skills (on  “skill  acquisition”  as  a  gradual  process  towards
possessing expertise, see Dreyfus 2004) – transformed into expertise.4
 
Ecologies of Expertise
13 The notion “ecologies of expertise” was introduced by Berkeley Anthropologist Aihwa
Ong during the workshop “Oikos and Anthropos: Rationality, Technology, Infrastructure”
held in Prague in 2002. She used the term in order to analyse what she perceived as a re-
assemblage of the forms of governance in the aftermath of the crisis experienced by the
so-called “Asian Tiger” economies in the late 1990s. As a reaction to the crisis of the
dominant  model  of  manufacturing export-led growth,  several  governments  in South-
Eastern  Asia  attempted  to  rebuild  the  basis  of  their  economies.  The  key  points  –
according to Ong – were the strengthening of the educational system, the founding of
research  institutions,  the  attempts  to  attract  expatriates  and  experts  to  boost  local
research  and  the  development  as  well  as  the  introduction  of  neoliberal  forms  of
governance.  According  to  Ong,  the  technocrats  implementing  these  new  forms  of
governance used terms such as 
[…] web, cluster and ecosystem to suggest new forms of linkages, exchanges, and
feedback loops that [were …] being forged between the distribution of knowledge
flows and the technical resources, and techniques of management. 
14 As Ong observed, Asian technocrats tried to create favorable conditions for innovation
and  economic  development  that  afforded  mobility  and  interactivity  of  experts,
knowledges and technologies. Ong (2005: 339) called
[…] this new techno-administrative zone that depends on novel combinations of
mobile knowledge and actors to diverse sites and labors an “ecology of expertise.”
Particular alignments of knowledge, politics, and ethics […] constitute an ecology of
positions, whereby diverse subjects are administered in relation to each other.
15 This perspective widens the classical approach to expertise, as it is applied in sociology of
science  or  political  science,  productively  in  directing  the  attention  towards
organizational  and  institutional  complexities  for  expertise  in  action.  Two  examples
demarcate the range of problems that are tackled under this perspective.
16 1st example: organizational complexities and the division of labor in networks of expertise
17 In  a  comprehensive  report  analysing  the  reasons  for  recent  failures  of  American
intelligence  agencies  to  predict  and  adequately  react  to  terrorist  threats,  Jeffrey  A.
Cooper  argues  that  the  specific  systemic  properties  of  the  intelligence  community
produced “paradoxical effects” – the system as a whole adapted too well to dominant
political perceptions of the uncontested role of the US in the post cold-war world as well
as  to  pressures  by  neo-liberal  programs  restructuring  and  streamlining  its  internal
processes: 
With its fifteen diverse agencies and its wide range of functional responsibilities,
the  Intelligence  Community  presents  a  very  complicated  set  of  organizational
arrangements.  Thinking  of  it  in  terms  of  traditional  organizational  analysis  or
systems engineering methods in an effort to explain its working does not suffice
because it far more resembles a living ecology with a complex web of many interacting
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entities,  dynamic  relationships,  non-linear  feedback  loops  (often  only  partially
recognized),  and  specific  functional  niches  that  reflect  momentarily  successful
adaptations to the environment. (Cooper 2005: 9)
18 But paradoxically, 
[…] the better they work, and, therefore, the more efficient the organization is at its
routine tasks, the greater the danger that the organization will fail to be sensitive
to its environment and changes occurring there. (Cooper 2005: 25)
19 2nd  example:  expertise  to  implement  sustainable  solutions  to  alleviate  environmental
problems
20 A second example for the productivity – but also the limits – of the “ecological approach”
to analyse expertise is a recent paper published by Ralf Brandt and Andrew Karvonen
inquiring into recent attempts to implement more sustainable solutions to perceived
environmental  problems.  The  study  looks  at  the  complex  relations  and  interactions
between different specialized experts – technical experts, including engineers, natural
scientists,  architects,  planners  –  in  managing  and  implementing  transformations  in
human-environmental systems. Instead of concentrating on the specific contents of the
expertise put into action, they apply a relational perspective on interacting expertise and
identify four idealtypical forms of applying expertise: 
The  outreach  expert who  communicates  effectively  to  non-experts,  the
interdisciplinary  expert who  understands  the  overlaps  of  neighbouring  technical
disciplines, the meta-expert who brokers the multiple claims of relevance between
different  forms  of  expertise,  and  the  civic  expert who  engages  in  democratic
discourse with non-experts and experts alike. (Brand & Karvonen 2007: 21)
21 Going somewhat beyond Cooper’s analysis of the internal pathologies of US intelligence
services,  Brand and Karvonen use the metaphor of “ecology” to address the complex
internal as well as external structural, economic, technological and political conditions or
obstacles that technical experts are confronted with in their attempts to address the
necessary systemic transformations in modern societies towards more sustainable ways
of living, consumption and production. In addition to knowledge in the core field of their
expertise,  these  “sustainability  experts”  have  to  possess  a  complex,  reflective
understanding  about  both  the  life-worlds  they  attempt  to  transform  and  the  often
problematic epistemic limits of expertise, incongruous disciplinary styles of thought and
structural-political barriers tthat he implementation of good ideas often confront. The
notion of  “ecology” here does a good job in directing the attention to the relational
complexities of interacting types of expertise. However, Brand and Karvonen do not shed
any light on what exactly makes an expert experienced in these forms of transaction, or
how  these  transactional  skills  are  acquired,  what kind  of  reflexivity  is  necessary  for
successful performance. Here, a rich field for anthropological analyzes is waiting to be
developed.
 
Towards a More Comprehensive Account of Ecological Relationality
22 The metaphor of “ecology” imported to the social sciences from biology is non-neutral:
attached to it are several conceptual assumptions that – if not properly discussed – afford
specific understandings and perspectives. I argue that the notion of ecology applied in
the  studies  quoted  above  conforms  to  the  classical  notion  of  ecology  and  –  more
importantly  –  to  the  classical  Darwinian  notion  of  adaptation  of  an  entity  to  its
environment. In Darwinian biology, 
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[…]  adaptation  has  been  regarded  as  a  process  by  which  natural  selection,
stemming from an external  environment,  gradually  molds organisms to be well
suited to their environments. (Day, Laland & Odling-Smee 2003: 81)
23 This assumes a linear process of adjustment of a species to pre-given circumstances. And
indeed, this linear concept is applied by the Asian governments analysed by Ong; they set
out to create what they see as “favourable environments” for the knowledge economy,
hoping that  experts  and expatriates  will  adapt  and become something like  the  “key
species” in the local economy. Similarly, Brandt and Karvonen study how each different
expert cultures settle into a specific “ecological niche” – be it as knowledge distributors
in relation to the public,  as  knowledge brokers in relation to other disciplines or as
political advisors. Cooper conceptualizes the failure of the intelligence system to adapt to
external change as a problem of an overly integrated eco-system, producing stability by
intensely  interacting  entities  that  have  lost  their  adaptability  to  external  selective
pressures. All expert cultures analysed here are foremost characterized by boundary work
in a twofold sense: a) internally, they are seen as building a system of densely interacting
individuals sharing a common style of thought and developing mechanisms of quality
control or evaluation of knowledge, characterized by a morality of professionalism and
clearly demarcated from the outside. This perspective has inherited much from the early
sociology of science à la Merton. But in addition, b) these analyses also point at how
expert-systems are mobilizing expertise across their maintained boundaries.
24 It  is  obvious  that  this  classical  notion  of  ecology  and  adaptation  assumes  certain
determinisms and linearities that are – apologies for the pun – not well adapted for
analytic purposes in the social sciences. But there is some conceptual help in biological
and evolutionary theory to improve the metaphor. 
Recently,  a  small  number  of  evolutionary  biologists  have  sought  a
reconceptualization  of  the  process  of  adaptation  by  placing  emphasis  on  niche
construction (Gray 1988; Griffiths & Gray 1994; Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman,
1996,  1999;  Lewontin  1982,  1983;  Odling-Smee  1988;  Odling-Smee,  Laland,  &
Feldman,  1996;  Oyama,  Griffiths,  &  Gray  2001).  These  researchers  treat  niche
construction as an evolutionary process in its own right,  rather than as a mere
product of natural selection. Through niche construction, organisms not only shape
the nature of  their world,  but also in part determine the selection pressures to
which they and their descendants are exposed. (Day, Laland & Odling-Smee 2003:
81) 
25 The concept of niche-construction is an important development in evolutionary theory
since it demonstrates empirically that “organisms regularly modify both biotic and a-
biotic sources of natural selection in their environments, thereby generating forms of
feedback in evolution that  are  rarely  considered in [classical]  evolutionary analyses”
(Day, Laland & Odling-Smee 2003: 83ff.). To sum up, niche-construction departs from a
linear,  deterministic  concept  where  environments  are  conceptualized  as  imprinting
specific characteristics on the inhabiting organisms through selection pressures; instead,
a  two-way  process  of  mutual  modification  and  selection  – informed  by  modern
cybernetics – is presupposed.
26 While still in the mode of “metaphorical thinking,” this revised ecological perspective
affords a much better stance on what expertise does: it shapes its environments and it is
shaped by  its  environments  in  a  fundamental  way;  historical  evidence  abounds  that
expertise successfully modifies its social and material environments in a fashion that is
favourable to its own existence – be it the emergence of the psy-disciplines analysed by
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Nikolas  Rose  (1998),  or  the  brand  of  Anglo-American  economics  celebrating  “free
markets” and de-regulation in the 1990s (with obvious miserable outcomes) brilliantly
analysed among others by anthropologist Gillian Tett (2009).
27 The  amended  notion  of  “ecologies  of  expertise”  is  well  equipped  to  take  this  truly
relational concept of expertise into account. But the concept will  only become useful
anthropologically when it will instigate a fresh, integrative perspective that productively
informs empirical studies that succeed in producing new insights. I will suggest that it
does so, especially as it opens up a way to think systematically about 1) how expertise is
formed in gradual steps via learning and active involvement with material-discursive
environments – in a way that John Dewey termed inquiry; 2) how expertise is stabilized
and  organized  in  systems  of  expertise,  including  the  establishment  of  standards,
evaluation criteria and professional morality; 3) how expertise is applied as a requisite of
skilful,  reflexive practices.  The notion of  “ecologies  of  expertise”  will  also  provide a
bridging concept that avoids a one-sided, mentalistic understanding of expertise as well
as providing a testing ground to inquire into the parallels of expertness or skilful practices __
e.g. opening an egg without making a mess on the kitchen counter, where knowledge is
applied to the material  environment (the example is taken form Tim Ingold’s  recent
lecture in Berlin) – and of expertise as an intellectual practice – e.g. in knowledge work,
where knowledge is applied to knowledge as Peter F. Drucker (1993: 69) defined it.
 
From Experience to Expertise
28 In order to provide an empirical basis to test the potential of the concept of “ecologies of
expertise” I will very briefly introduce a recent phenomenon in the medical domain: the
emergence of patient groups and the figure of the expert patient.5 Patient groups became
a phenomenon in all western welfare-states in the 1970s and gradually grew into what is
now considered – and acknowledged – as an important means of corrective action in the
medical  system.  Patient  groups  also  are  increasingly  shaping  aspects  of  the  medical
system, the provision of care, and are involved in bioethical debates. Steve Epstein has
demonstrated this regarding the US AIDS movement (Epstein 1996), Michel Callon and
Volona Rabeharisoa through their analyses of the French Muscular Dystrophy Association
(Callon & Rabeharisoa 2008). In all those cases, existential experience of severe, often life-
threatening diseases and the problems arising during therapeutic interventions in the
clinic but also – more importantly – in the life-worlds of patients is systematized and
transferred to other, less experienced patients. Vololona Rabeharisoa and Michel Callon
(2008) describe two crucial functions of patient groups: they serve as devices for – as they
call it – the “primitive accumulation of knowledge” and as sites for “mutual learning”:
experienced patients not only give emotional support and basic information to fellow
sufferers,  they also accumulate knowledge,  for example about individual  reactions to
treatments,  about side-effects or firsthand data about the course of diseases.  Because
many of these patient-groups are devoted to rare diseases of which clinical medicine –
not only because of the small patient numbers – has no sufficient knowledge, patients and
their  associations  are  likely  to  collect  data  that  has  the  potential  “to  enhance  the
efficiency  of  medical  services.  [...]  patients  and their  association[s]  are  the  origin of
numerous  documents  on  the  effects  of  drugs,  and  readily  discuss  such  issues  with
specialists”  (ibid., 147f.),  often  as  equals.  The  activities  of  most  patient  groups  go
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decidedly beyond a  “primitive” accumulation of  knowledge.  They can and should be
analyzed as sites where the making of expertise can be studied in situ.
29 This is even more so in my last example – I will draw on fieldwork of two members of a
currently running research project at the Department of European Ethnology in Berlin,6
looking  at  therapeutic  practices  in  two  psychiatric  clinics (Martina  Klausner)  and
“Trialog-Gruppen” (Julie Mewes) in and near Berlin. The “trialog” approach in psychiatric
care, which was developed in the 1990s in a Hamburg clinic, brings together professionals
from psychiatry, patients, and their relatives in groups that are inspired by modes of
interaction as they are practiced in many self-help groups. The key principle here is that
all interactions have to be “at eye-level” (auf Augenhöhe), meaning that professional and
medical knowledge is de-privileged on purpose, and that the perspectives of patients and
relatives are treated as equally valid and important as the professional stance to diseases.
The aim is to “widen the understanding of psychiatric phenomena” for all participants, to
develop a common vocabulary and to implement an atmosphere of mutual respect (Bock
et  al. 2007:  10).  It  is  argued here that  this  “de-privileging” or  active concealment  of
therapeutic and biomedical expertise on the part of the professionals goes beyond the
established  psychoanalytic  procedures  which  aim  at  eliciting  narratives,  views  and
emotions from patients.
30 It  is  enlightening  to  observe  the  discursive  and  interactional  practices  that  try  to
implement these programmatic goals in actual care settings, as Martina Klausner did in
her fieldwork: the main instrument is the “Stuhlkreis” – sitting in circles – providing a
material environment, symbolizing and enabling equality, where everyday experiences and
perceptions of/with psychiatric states are articulated and reflected upon. The “Stuhlkreis”
enables a mode of collective inquiry – in the sense of Dewey (Gewissheit) – of probing,
evaluating,  experimenting  with  perceptions  and  interpretations  of  “Erlebnisse”
(experience1)  and  their  step-by-step  transformation  into  more  stable  “Erfahrungen”
(experience2).  In  a  gradual  process,  sometimes  covering  many  months,  bewildering,
problematic, frightening existential experiences (Erlebnisse = experience1) of all participants
are transformed into experiences that are open to rational reflection (Erfahrung = experience2)
and finally to a kind of expertness in dealing with often chronic psychiatric disorders in a mode
of expertise characterized by “Lebensklugheit” or even “Weisheit” (Baltes and Staudinger
2000). “Having a psychiatric disorder” is transformed collaboratively into the ability to
skilfully and reflexively live with an exceptional psychic condition. What is characteristic
here is that the psychiatric professionals do not act as the “outreach experts” described
by  Brand and Karvonen (2007)  nor  are  they  involved in  engaging  the  “contributory
expertise” of patients, like Collins and Evans (2002) described. Instead, the professionals
engage in a truly collaborative mode of knowledge/expertise making.
31 This approach is taken up and developed further in a recent project in Hamburg, where
experienced psychiatry patients are systematically trained as “para-professionals” and
“peer-councelors”  for  fellow  patients  in  a  year-long  program.  The  program
“EXperienced-INvolvement” (EX-IN)  is  funded by the European Union and the public
health system; on the one hand it attempts to mobilize the existential expertise of former
patients for the benefit of other patients, reacting to perceived deficits of psychiatric
care;  on  the  other  hand  it  attempts  to  reintegrate  these  former  patients  into  the
workforce through applying them as lecturers and co-workers in psychiatric care units
and Trialog-groups.
The Problem of Expertise
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015
9
32 What is emerging here is a new type of “knowledge space” where – in the words of David
Turnbull – not the “idealistic linking of ideas [… is in the center of interest but the] social
process of linking people, practices and places” (Turnbull 2001: 3). These processes aim at
the production of expertise outside of the certified educational institutions invented by
modern societies, universities, research institutions, laboratories. It is an expertise that is
impregnated  with  a  certain  authenticity that  –  in  the  eyes  of  everybody  involved
– enhances the trustworthiness and reliability of disseminated knowledges. At the same
time, and partially owing to this authenticity-index,  the expertise produced is highly
“localized,” integrated into specific “ecologies” and problem scapes. But at the same time,
this localized,  specific expertise is  mobilized beyond the boundaries of  the particular
“knowledge scapes” in a systematic way.
33 However, there are some anthropological problems with this implicit celebration of what
might  be  called authenticated  expertise.  I  interpret  the  success  of  these  new forms of
producing and mobilizing expertise in the medical domain as a reaction to a fundamental
authority crisis of the medical profession, an attempt by professionals to overcome the
lack of trust which many patients exhibit in relation the medical system and especially
the abstractness and technicality of biomedical expertise. On the one hand, this can be
interpreted as an attempt to “humanize” biomedicine – polemically, it is pills with a human
face. On the other hand, these programs might run the danger to reproduce deeply and
dearly  held  (mis-)understandings  of  the  western  subject.  As  anthropologist  Robert
Desjarlais (1997: 12) problematizes: 
The problem with taking experience as a uniquely authentic domain of life – as the
first and last court of appeal – is that we risk losing the opportunity to question
both the social production of that domain and the practices that define its use.
34 Desjarlais  suggests  to  treat  experience  as  a  “historically  and  culturally  constituted
process predicated on certain ways of being in the world.” Experience results from 
[…] specific cultural articulations of selfhood (namely, a sense of self as possessing
depth, interiority, unity, stability, and the capacity for transcendence) as well as
certain social and technological conditions that foster and legitimate that sense of
the self. (Desjarlais 1997: 13)
35 These caveats are important to caution against the naïve celebration of the “authentic
experience” that “expert-patients” command or the assumption that these experiences
are not carefully crafted artefacts. With the words of Clifford Geertz (1986: 380): 
Experiences,  like  tales,  fetes,  potteries,  rites,  dramas,  images,  memoirs,
ethnographies,  and allegorical  machineries,  are made; and it  is  such things that
make them. The “anthropology of experience,” like the anthropology of anything
else, is a study of the uses of artifice and the endlessness of it.
36 Yet, it would be myopic to miss two simple facts: one, that these expert patients and the
mobilized experience of concerned people are valuable for other patients. And two, that
beyond  the  well  founded  deconstruction  of  all  claims  for  “authenticity,”  these
experiences/this expertise have a poietic quality – they make a difference in the life of
other patients.
37 The “Stuhlkreis” introduced above is a prototypical Geertzian instance of using artifice to
craft experience, to accumulate experiences and turn them into expertise applicable to
the  benefit  of  others:  the  carefully  designed physical  and discursive  environment  of
sitting  in  circles  and  the  afforded  interactions  between  patients,  professionals  and
relatives at “eye level” constitute a machinery for assessing, evaluating, estimating, and
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re-producing  experiences1 (=  Erlebnisse),  shifting  or  modifying  their  meaning  and
gradually turning them into experiences2 (= Erfahrungen). Experiences2 in this sense are
conceptually  enhanced or  amended versions of  life-world events.  What  is  added post-hoc 
through  the  deliberations  in  the  Stuhlkreis is  a  scientifically  informed,  collectively
reflected perspectival shift. Experiences2 – then – differ decidedly from vernacular as well
as philosophical notions of “experience” as they are held dearly in western modernity. In
order to clarify this difference, a brief detour to John Dewey’s approach to “experience” is
helpful.
 
John Dewey and “having an experience”
38 In chapter three of his Art as Experience, John Dewey differentiates between experience and
an  experience. While  experience occurs  continuously  as  an  unavoidable  result  of  the
“interaction of live creature and environing conditions,” humans have an experience 
[…] when the material  experienced runs its course to fulfilment.  Then and only
then is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience
from other experiences. […] a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a
game of chess, carrying on a conversation […] is so rounded out that its close is a
consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with
it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience. (Dewey
1934: 35) 
39 Crucial for Dewey is further that an experience is characterized by the unity of emotional,
practical and intellectual dimensions of the situations or events such perceived; these
events have a certain “aesthetic quality,” they are characterized by καλον-αγατον, by a
distictive perception of proportion, grace, and harmony (Dewey 1934: 39) between the
situation and the situated human. In another passage, Dewey further elaborates his
relational approach to experience as follows:
A man does something; he lifts, let us say, a stone. In consequence he undergoes, suffers,
something: the weight, strain, texture of the surface of the thing lifted. The properties thus
undergone determine further doing. The stone is too heavy or too angular, not solid enough;
or else the properties  undergone show it  is  fit  for  the use for which it  is  intended. The
process continues until a mutual adaptation of the self and the object emerges and
that particular experience comes to a close. What is true of this simple instance is true,
as to form, of every experience. The creature operating may be a thinker in his study and the
environment  with  which  he  interacts  may  consist  of  ideas  instead  of  a  stone. But
interaction of the two constitutes the total experience that is had, and the close
which completes it is the institution of a felt harmony. (Dewey 1934: 44; emph. S.B.)
40 According to Dewey, the aesthetic dimension of experience refers to a specific relation
between doing and undergoing, of activity and suffering, perception, appreciation, and
enjoyment, that sustains the special status of an event that is perceived as an experience.
Here, emotions, cognitions, and practices are inseparably intertwined; and they emerge in
response and adaptation to an environment that is modified in turn. What Dewey defined as
an  experience corresponds  to  experience 1 as  it  was  introduced  above.  The  aesthetic
quality,  the  felt  “harmony”  and  the  integration  of  emotional,  practical  as  well  as
intellectual dimensions that according to Dewey defines an experience for an individual
affords a specific “authenticity”: the experience is inseparably linked with a person, his/
her past and present, and the situation he/she suffered in or lived through; an experience
is held to be a defining moment for the whole person.
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Building Expertise: Systematic Re-formatting of Experience
1
41 Against the backdrop of these observations, it becomes clearer what has to be achieved in
the interactions of the Stuhlkreis and what is at stake when experiences of patients are to
be turned into a resource for other patients, when patients are gradually transformed
into  expert  patients. It  would  simply  be  futile  on  part  of  the  professionals  to  try  to
“correct” the past perceptions of patients through providing “scientific explanations” for
their  perceptual  experiences.  Such  an  intellectualistic  approach  would  leave  the
emotional  and  practical  dimension  of  their  experiences,  the  “aesthetic  whole”
unaddressed. Purely post-hoc intellectualisations will miss the interactive, ecological nature
of experiences that are the outcome of a mutual, self-amplifying adaptation of actors and
their  natural,  social,  and  cultural  environments.  And  indeed,  successful  therapeutic
interventions  in  the  psychiatric  clinic  require  an  ecological  approach  to  psychiatric
pathologies which takes neurological, social as well as cultural phenomena into account.
42 The “Stuhlkreis” is part of a clinical setting that first of all – according to professionals in
psychiatric care – provides patients with a shelter (Schutzraum) that foremost has the
function to disrupt the everyday entanglements of patients with their social and material
environments;  the  clinic  de-routinizes  the  patient,  disrupts  his  habitual  practices  and
customary  behaviours.  Psychotropic  drugs  have  the  same  effect  on  a  physiological,
neurological level – they shift/modify cognitive pattern
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NOTES
1. This line of argument will not pursued further in the following paper. That this surprising
absence might be a phenomenon deserving closer examination, though, is especially evident in
the case in Tim Ingold’s relational anthropology. In a personal communication in fall 2011 Ingold
conceded that while reading Dewey a long time ago he somehow found his approach as not being
very  helpful;  however,  a  re-appreciation of  pragmatist  theories  might  be  –  as  he  asserted  –
helpful  to  develop  his  relational  approach  further.  This  intuition  is  shared  in  the  following
argument.
2. These “kinds” are usually not understood in the sense introduced by Hacking (2002).  This
perspective, though, is considered to be crucial, as it will be elaborated below.
3. It can be plausibly argued that these questions cover well covered ground: in the 1970s these
issues were rigorously analysed, for instance, at the “Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der
Lebensbedingungen der  wissenschaftlich-technischen  Welt”  in  Starnberg  near  Munich.  The
rather  fundamental  quest  was  about  “Alternativen  in  der  Wissenschaft”  –  alternative
developments  in  science  and  –  ultimately  –  the  production  of  other  kinds  of  truth  and
technological  solutions  for  social  needs  not  conforming  to  the  demands  of  the  capitalist
economy.
4. The notion of transaction is borrowed from Dewey & Bentley (1975).
5. For a fuller account on “expert patients,” see Beck (2010).
6. Note  by  the  editors:  Stefan  Beck  was  head  of  the  research  project  “The  production  of
Chronicity in the context of mental health care and research in Berlin,” funded by the German
National Science Foundation 2010-2013. Since he delivered the paper at the 2012 conference, a
number  of  publications  have  come  out  (Klausner  2015a;  Klausner  2015b;  Klausner,  Bister,
Niewöhner & Beck 2015; Mewes 2012).
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ABSTRACTS
The problem of expertise plays a key role in current scientific and political debates. Dominant
approaches to expertise are focused on knowledge as an idealistic  content.  Given the partial
inadequacy  of  these  perspectives,  an  amended  theoretical  and  methodological  approach  is
needed. This paper aims then at sketching a relational conceptualization of expertise. At this
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